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Introduction
The agreement reached by the EU and Turkey on Friday 18 March 
is aimed at limiting and controlling the arrival of migrants on 
the European continent, re-establishing order at the EU’s exter-
nal and internal borders, and alleviating social and political ten-
sions in individual member states, while preserving the unity 
of the Union. Migrants crossing the Aegean will be sent back to 
Turkey; for each migrant returned, a Syrian refugee will be re-
settled to one of countries of the European Union, though the 
total number of re-settled individuals will be capped at 72,000. 
Legal mechanisms of re-settlement are intended to dry up the 
Aegean and Balkan routes, and limit what has been seen as mas-
sive, disorderly arrivals of refugees in the EU. 
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Summary
What has come to be called the ‘refugee crisis’ is the latest in a se-
ries of crises bedevilling the European Union – the four-fold mon-
etary, budgetary, economic and financial ‘Euro-crisis’; a geopo-
litical security challenge posed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, 
the war in Syria and incursions into NATO airspace, and a looming 
Brexit, combined with the possible fragmentation of old EU mem-
ber states like the United Kingdom and Spain. The ‘refugee crisis’ 
is the most serious of all. It encapsulates the EU’s failings and 
failures that other crises laid bare: the lack of long-term prevision 
and strategy, an overburdened decision-making system, and an 
outmoded conception of sovereignty. It goes to the very heart of 
the EU, for three reasons: Firstly, the cleavages it creates between 
member states add to those that have been dividing the EU since 
the early days of the Euro-crisis; secondly, the massive displace-
ment of populations gives rise to complex problems, sparking 
controversies that weaken the social and political fabric of indi-
vidual member states and feed into populism and xenophobia; 
and, thirdly, the German Chancellor, who has played a crucial role 
in alleviating, if not solving, other crises, is facing domestic and 
European rebellions for her handling of the refugee issue. Will the 
agreement that the EU and Turkey concluded on 18 March 2016 
manage to limit the influx of refugees, patch up differences, and 
re-establish Angela Merkel’s authority in Germany and in the Un-
ion?
However, the agreement gives rise to as many questions as it 
purports to solve. For implementation it relies heavily on the 
willingness of a neighbour, Turkey, and does not differ from 
previous EU migration and border policies that have entailed 
outsourcing control and security to the European periphery. 
It does not address the issue of non-Syrian refugees who, 
desperate for new routes, will fall prey to more dangerous 
smugglers; and it raises questions as to whether capping the 
number of re-settled refugees will deter others from sneaking 
into the EU. 
This Policy Brief examines the causes of the current ‘Euro-
refugee crisis’, debunking some common misconceptions, 
and underlining the weaknesses of the EU’s policies and 
decision-making system. In particular, it points at the EU’s 
failure to foresee and prevent the crisis, due to the miscon-
ceived policy of outsourcing border and migration controls. 
Finally, it enquires into the resilience of the EU and of the 
German Chancellor.  
 
Causes: A bundle of micro- and macro-decisions 
The EU cannot be held responsible for the massive arrival of 
refugees on its territory in 2015 and 2016, nor can Chancel-
lor Merkel. Actually, the current wave of arrivals dates back 
to 2011, with rebellion, repression and descent into war in 
Libya and Syria, and chaos in failed states from Afghanistan 
to Africa. In 2010, 100,000 undocumented migrants (the 
term refers to both ‘economic migrants’ and individuals who 
are persecuted or fleeing from war zones) crossed the external 
borders of the EU. According to Frontex, there were 140,000 
in 2011, and 280,000 in 2014. Their numbers kept rising as 
chaos spread and took root. Certainly, it may be argued that 
Western countries withdrew too quickly from Libya after the 
military intervention in 2011, and failed to pacify Afghani-
stan and Iraq. Yet these criticisms gloss over complex domes-
tic and regional dynamics, the lack of national cohesion, the 
instrumentalization of religion, and the prevalence of secu-
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rity apparatuses over civil administrations, particularly in 
Arab states. In 2015 came a drastic increase in the number 
of departures, from Syria and Iraq or from refugee camps in 
neighboring countries, as ISIS consolidated its foothold there 
and, as of September Russia started bombing moderates and 
civilians, or from Eritrea, Sudan or Somalia. Barred from re-
turning home, refugees looked to the next harbour: the Eu-
ropean Union. 
Nor is it correct to attribute to Chancellor Merkel the deci-
sion to fling wide open the doors to refugees in August 2016. 
Certainly, she raised her voice to welcome refugees, mainly 
Syrians. On 31 August, while conceding that some confusion 
reigned, she made a forceful statement that she would often 
repeat in the following months: ‘We can do it’ (Wir schaffen 
das). A few days later, Germany and Austria embraced the 
refugees who had remained behind when Hungary closed 
its borders. We can only hazard guesses at the reasons that 
motivated the Chancellor’s decision. Those who recalled the 
removal of barbed wire along the Hungarian–Austrian border 
in May 1989, leading to the liberation of Eastern Europe and 
the reunification of Germany and indeed of the continent, 
were shocked to see another Hungarian government erecting 
a fence. The Chancellor referred to a ‘humanitarian impera-
tive’, an expression coined by her close confidante Peter Alt-
maier, head of Chancellery and Minister for Special Affairs. 
She also recognized that those EU member states where 
refugees first set foot, Greece essentially, could not be left 
alone to deal with a massive influx of newcomers. The deci-
sion was also part of an attempt to refurbish Germany’s image 
that had been tarnished by the government’s pro-austerity 
policy towards Athens. The widely circulated and influential 
newspaper Bild started a campaign, ‘#welcomerefugees’, to 
rebuild Germany’s credit among EU members. Other reasons 
stemmed from longer-term calculations. In 2014, the Chan-
cellor had hailed Germany as Einwanderungsland, a country 
of immigration and diversity, to counter adverse demographic 
trends and the declining workforce there. 
Chancellor Merkel gave Europe a voice, the voice that the Arab 
rebels should have heard early on in 2011. But she did not 
alter the course of events that had taken shape before. Many 
actors – not only individuals who decided to head for Europe, 
but also administrations and governments – contributed to 
the rising tide of refugees. At the beginning of 2015, the Ger-
man Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt 
für Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF), an agency of the Min-
istry of the Interior, decided to streamline the procedures for 
asylum-seekers from Syria, Iraq and Eritrea. On 21 August, 
it ultimately stopped enforcing the deportation of Syrian 
refugees to the first country of arrival. From then on, Ger-
many opened its door to refugees without having them first 
registered in the country of first arrival, and made it much 
easier for Syrians, Iraqis and Eritreans to obtain asylum. Here 
again, various reasons came into play. BAMF had been hurt 
by austerity measures, and, because of its limited capacities, 
a considerable backlog in the treatment of claims had built 
up over the years. With the dramatic deterioration of the situ-
ation in their countries, the case of Syrians, Iraqis and Eri-
treans seemed relatively clear. Finally, the cost, inefficiency, 
and often illegality of deportation ruled out any other policy. 
BAMF merely made official what had become reality over the 
previous few years. As early as August 2016, the Minister 
of the Interior, Thomas de Maizière, predicted that 800,000 
migrants would reach Germany by the end of the year. Others 
already spoke of a million.
The EU’s mistakes: Outsourcing
The European Union made several serious mistakes. First, even 
though EU agencies and institutions, like Frontex and the DG 
Home Affairs, were aware of the growing number of arrivals 
well before 2015, no strategy was devised.  Over the years, the 
European Council has increasingly become the strategic centre 
of EU decision-making, for several reasons: not least because 
member states have come to discard the Monnet Method for 
the sake of sovereignty, including Berlin since the latter part 
of the 1990s. Angela Merkel came also to believe that locat-
ing decision-making in the European Council would promote 
speed and efficiency. The converse actually happened. As crises 
emerged, the European Council met with increasing frequency, 
organizing ordinary or extraordinary meetings that pre-empted 
or bypassed the Council of Ministers. It became overburdened. 
When asked why the EU had not foreseen the upcoming crisis, a 
German minister retorted that he could not ‘multi-task’. 
Taken off guard, the European Council could not quickly and 
efficiently elaborate a strategy, which had for years been piece-
meal at best, devised for a time when the influx of migrants 
was less heavy. The abolition of internal borders just before 
and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the necessity of guarding 
the EU’s external borders, the onslaught of wars in the former 
Yugoslavia, the greying of the continent, and the plight of 
refugees, many of whom died at sea trying to reach the shores 
of Europe, should have prompted the EU to adopt common 
migratory, refugee and border policies. For years, interna-
tional organizations like the High Commission for Refugees, 
or NGOs like Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch 
had been urging the EU to create and implement a policy that 
would allow safe passage for refugees who ‘have the right to 
have rights’ (Hannah Arendt). Instead, the Europeans stuck 
to national policies that limited economic migration, avoided 
establishing common external border controls worthy of the 
name, and cobbled together a policy towards migrants which 
they essentially outsourced to the EU’s internal and external 
peripheries – with fatal consequences.
The Dublin Convention and Regulations require the countries 
of first arrival in the EU – essentially Greece, Italy and Spain 
– to register migrants and examine their claims, in order to 
prevent asylum-seekers from filing requests in several member 
states simultaneously. The outer periphery was also drawn in 
to filter transit and arrivals. Re-admission agreements were 
signed between the EU or individual member states and neigh-
bouring countries – or countries farther away – requiring the 
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latter to readmit nationals or third-countries nationals who 
enter the EU illegally through their territory, in exchange for 
financial and technical help. The EU seemed well protected 
by a twin frontier – as long as the governments of the inter-
nal and external periphery were able and willing to play the 
game. 
However, the EU member states that are the main countries 
of first arrival are economically poor, and administratively 
understaffed. A European Refugee Fund (ERR) was created 
to improve accommodation infrastructure, and legal assist-
ance to refugees, and Frontex helped register asylum-seekers 
at points of entry. However, both had limited funding and 
scope of action. Furthermore, Greece is currently in breach of 
international law. After the European Court of Human Rights 
ruled, in 2011, that the country did not respect the rights 
of refugees, other EU courts stopped returning migrants to 
Greece. Led by Alexis Tsipras, the coalition of the left-wing 
party Syriza and national conservative and populist ANEL, 
which came to power in Greece in January 2015, decided 
to abide by certain international commitments, and to stop 
deporting to their countries of origin those refugees who had 
not applied for asylum but who belonged to categories that 
needed protection. More surprisingly, Athens refrained from 
requesting EU emergency support. It might have wanted to 
obtain revision of a policy that places on Greece – and a few 
other states – the onus of guarding the EU’s borders. Building 
up capacity and facilities, and detaining economic migrants 
and asylum-seekers in pre-removal centres, as the previous 
government had, would have been tantamount to support-
ing the ‘common refugee policy’ – besides disregarding 
principles. The government also probably used the crisis as a 
bargaining chip to obtain more help from the EU to meet the 
heavy financial and societal costs of the migrant influx, and 
to widen its room for manoeuvre in negotiating with interna-
tional and European institutions the financial and economic 
terms of a settlement in the Eurozone. 
 
Europe’s quandary
Meanwhile, outsourcing has played into the hands of 
countries of the external periphery, some of which are 
governed by authoritarian regimes whose main concern is 
certainly not the welfare of their own populations, let alone 
of migrants. In the past, Colonel Qaddafi obtained fund-
ing and recognition in return for keeping migrants at bay, 
but the EU was hardly in a position to verify the conditions 
under which they lived. While hosting more than two mil-
lion refugees on its soil, most of them in dire straits, Turkey 
also exploits the current crisis to embarrass the EU and 
exact concessions. The Turkish authorities are said to have 
turned a blind eye to smugglers who exploit refugee vulner-
abilities. Between September 2015 and March 2016, when 
the EU–Turkey agreement was struck, the Turkish govern-
ment also used strong-arm tactics to try to wrench conces-
sions from the EU in return for guarding European coasts 
and re-admitting migrants crossing the Aegean. EU mem-
bership negotiations that had come to a standstill because 
of the blockade over Cyprus, the opposition of President 
Sarkozy, and Ankara’s turn towards illiberalism, were to be 
re-invigorated – while, at the same time, President Erdoğan 
derided the European Union, and railed against democracy.
Yet the agreement struck on 18 March does not grant the 
Turkish government everything it asked for in return for 
readmitting all migrants crossing the Aegean, heeding their 
rights according to international law, and ensuring decent 
conditions thanks to funds allocated by the Commission. At 
present, Turkey does not meet all the conditions necessary 
to open up new chapters but one on budgetary matters, 
or to allow visa liberation. Moreover, the disbursement of 
twice €3 billion must be traceable. In this regard, the Com-
mission and the Council are not flouting requirements. 
Given these circumstances, it seems far from certain that 
the Turkish government will abide by its commitments and 
keep refugees on its soil, let alone under acceptable condi-
tions.
Further, while the EU has imposed conditionality in certain 
areas, it disregards the dire state of democracy, human and 
minority rights in Turkey, as well as the rights of migrants. 
It has entered into an agreement with a government that 
has become increasingly authoritarian, that has impris-
oned liberals, dismissed them from their jobs, and that has 
restarted a bloody war against its Kurdish minority. The EU 
is also turning against refugees. While in theory asylum-
seekers may file claims in Greece and enjoy the right of 
appeal, which would prevent Turkish or Turkish-Kurdish 
asylum seekers from being returned to Turkey, the capaci-
ties of the Greek authorities to examine claims remain lim-
ited despite the help that the EU is slowly providing. It is 
also doubtful that a government that sets aside the rights 
of parts of its own population would respect the rights of 
refugees. Since Ankara has not signed the New York Pro-
tocol granting rights to non-Europeans refugees, but gives 
them only temporary protection according to a regulation 
it adopted in 2014, it may return then to their home coun-
tries. For EU member states, in this case Greece, to declare 
Turkey a ‘safe third country’ is simply one bridge too far.  
 
Conclusion: Will Merkel survive?
The EU contravened its own principles in agreeing to send 
refugees back to Turkey. Criticism has not spared Angela 
Merkel, who hammered out the agreement with the Turkish 
Prime Minister and capped the number of Syrian refugees 
who can be re-settled to the EU, though she has repeatedly 
rejected the notion of Obergrenze (upper limit) in her own 
country. Merkel cannot escape the dilemma that states face: 
According to international law, refugees have the right to 
seek protection, also by illegally crossing borders. Yet states 
have to control their borders, maintain order and ensure 
the security of their citizenry – although the definition of 
order and security is political and varies according to gov-
ernments and majorities. The German Chancellor has lost 
her moral compass. But can she consolidate her position 
and salvage the Union?
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Beyond its disregard for the rights of Turkish democrats and 
refugees, the March 2016 agreement does not offer a proper 
solution to Europe’s ‘refugee question’. Most probably, the 
Aegean/Balkan route will dry up. With the announcement 
of new and stricter measures, refugees will stop seeking 
salvation through the Eastern Mediterranean. However, as 
always, other routes will open up – and one is particularly 
frightening, not only for migrants but also for EU citizens 
and governments: the Libyan route, where Daesh can make 
profits from trafficking. Once more, we see that the Euro-
peans have chosen a short-term fix in lieu of a long-term 
strategy. 
The EU 28 managed to reach a compromise, as they did 
during the Yugoslav wars, to preserve a semblance of unity. 
They rallied behind Germany’s Chancellor Merkel, after 
having watered down some of her concessions towards 
Turkey. However, the rifts that divide EU member states – 
and the states of the Balkans, some of which are candidate 
countries – concerning refugee policies have not disap-
peared. Indeed, they serve to reinforce cleavages which 
have emerged over the years: between pro-austerity govern-
ments, and countries that suffer from the Euro-crisis; and 
between governments that oppose Russia’s energy domi-
nance in Europe and those that favour closer ties. In this cri-
sis, Angela Merkel has lost some of her aura and influence 
for having imposed policies or solutions repugnant to many, 
and Berlin has stood rather isolated, though the summit of 
18 March may have helped to disguise this. 
In Germany itself, however, Angela Merkel has recouped 
some of her power, not only because so many stand behind 
her, but also because opposition to her policies and even her 
chancellorship has gone too far. In particular, the campaign 
that Germans of Russian background, supported by the Rus-
sian Minister of Foreign Affairs, orchestrated at the begin-
ning of this year, protesting against the alleged abduction 
of a Russian-German girl by refugees, and the dissolution of 
law and order in Germany, created a backlash in the media 
and the broader public. Even if the right-wing Alternative für 
Deutschland gained seats in regional parliaments in March, 
it is not certain that it will become more than a protest party. 
At present, the centre still holds in Germany.
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